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Abstract
The literature on New Keynesian models with search frictions in the labor market commonly 
assumes that price-setters are not actually subject to such frictions. Here I propose a 
model where fi rms are subject both to infrequent price adjustment and search frictions. 
This interaction gives rise to real price rigidities, which have the effect of slowing down the 
adjustment of the price level to shocks. This has a number of consequences for equilibrium 
dynamics. First, infl ation becomes less volatile and more persistent. More importantly, the 
model’s empirical performance improves along its labor market dimensions, such as the 
size of unemployment fl uctuations and the relative volatility of the two margins of labor.
Keywords: search and matching, real rigidities, New Keynesian Phillips curve, labor market 
fl uctuations.
JEL classifi cation: E32, J60.
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1 Introduction
The search and matching model has become a popular treatment of labor market dynamics in
New Keynesian models of the monetary transmission mechanism.1 One of the main advantages
of this kind of framework is that it makes it possible to analyze the joint dynamics of unem-
ployment and in ation in a relatively simple way. Due to search frictions in the labor market,
it takes time for unemployed workers to nd jobs. This, together with recurrent job destruc-
tion, gives rise to unemployment in equilibrium. On the other side of the labor market, search
frictions imply that rms must spend time and resources before they can nd suitable workers.
To the extent that rms have monopoly power on the goods they sell, this naturally raises the
question as to how pricing decisions are aected by the fact that rms cannot costlessly and
instantaneously adjust the size of their workforce.
In fact, the existing literature has paid very little attention to the latter question. The reason
is an assumption commonly made in previous studies, namely that the rms setting prices are
dierent from the rms that are subject to search frictions.2 These two subsets of rms are
sometimes called ’retailers’ and ’producers’, respectively, whereby the latter sell an intermediate
good to retailers at a perfectly competitive price. This assumption is very convenient, as
it allows one to disentangle forward-looking vacancy-posting and pricing decisions and thus
simplify the analysis. However, it eliminates from the outset the possibility of analyzing the
eect of search frictions on the pricing decisions of individual rms. The aim of this paper is to
build a model where price-setters do face such frictions, and analyze the resulting implications
for equilibrium dynamics. In particular, I consider a framework in which rms reset their prices
at random intervals. In order to meet a sudden change in demand for its product, each rm
can immediately adjust the number of hours worked by its employees. However, in order to
adjust employment the rm must rst incur the cost of posting vacancies and then wait for the
1For a simple exposition of the search and matching model, see Pissarides (2000, Ch. 1).
2See for instance Walsh (2005), Trigari (2009), Christoel and Linzert (2005), Andrés et al. (2006), Blanchard
and Galí (2010), Barnichon (2008) and Thomas (2008).
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latter to be lled.
I nd that the interaction of price-setting decisions and search frictions slows down the
adjustment of the price level to shocks. The reason is the following. Due to search frictions,
rms’ short-run marginal costs depend on the cost of increasing production along the intensive
margin of labor. Wage bargaining between the rm and its workers implies that the latter must
be compensated for the disutility of work. If the latter is realistically convex in hours worked,
rms’ marginal cost curves become upward-sloping.3 This gives price-setting rms an incentive
to keep their prices in line with the overall price level. That is, search frictions give rise to
real rigidities in prices, using Ball and Romer’s (1990) terminology. For example, suppose
that following an aggregate shock that decreases marginal costs, each price-setter considers a
certain reduction in its nominal price. Given the prices of other rms, the reduction in the
rm’s nominal price represents a reduction in its real price. This leads the rm to anticipate
stronger sales and therefore higher marginal costs for the duration of the price contract. As a
result, the rm ends up choosing a smaller price cut than the one initially considered. Because
all price-setters follow the same logic, real rigidities slow the adjustment of the overall price
level in response to the same  uctuations in average real marginal costs. This eect is re ected
in a  atter slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
The real rigidity mechanism just described is absent in New Keynesian search-and-matching
models with a producer-retailer structure, because each retailer’s marginal cost (the price of the
intermediate good) is independent of its own output. Interestingly, I show that the log-linear
equilibrium conditions in a producer-retailer model with identical preferences and technology
are exactly the same as in the model with real rigidities, except for the slope of the New
Keynesian Phillips curve. This allows me to use the producer-retailer model as a ’control’
for isolating the eect of real rigidities on equilibrium dynamics. Two main results arise.
First, in ation becomes less volatile and more persistent for a given frequency of nominal
3The notion that the marginal wage (and hence the marginal cost of production) is increasing in average
hours per employee goes back to Bils (1987). See also Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
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price adjustment. Through this endogenous mechanism, real rigidities help the model match
in ation dynamics without the need of assuming unrealistically long price contracts. This is a
well-known property of real rigidity mechanisms, as exemplied by models with rm-specic
capital (Sveen and Weinke, 2005; Woodford, 2005; and Altig et al., 2004) and models with
industry-specic labor markets (Woodford, 2003).
Second, and perhaps more importantly, real rigidities improve the empirical performance of
the New Keynesian search-and-matching model along those labor market dimensions that the
standard New Keynesian model is not designed to address. For a plausible calibration, and
relative to the producer-retailer specication, I show that the model with real rigidities comes
closer to US data in two important dimensions: the volatility of unemployment (both in absolute
terms and relative to output), and the volatility of the extensive margin of labor (employment)
relative to the intensive margin (hours per employee).4 At the heart of these results is again
the interaction between infrequent price adjustment and search frictions, together with the
long-term nature of employment relationships in this framework. Once the rm sets its price,
its output is demand-determined and its revenue is independent of its number of employees.
Therefore, job creation decisions are driven, not by the marginal revenue product of new hires
(as in  exible price models), but by the fact that hiring additional workers allows the rm
to satisfy its future demand with less hours per employee and thus reduce its wage bill. This
implies that, when rms expect hours per employee to be higher in future periods, they have an
incentive to create more jobs. By making the price level more sluggish, real rigidities amplify
 uctuations in aggregate demand and hence in hours per employee; as a result, job creation
becomes more volatile and so does unemployment. Crucially, since what matters for job creation
4This part of the analysis has some connection with the literature on unemployment volatility in search
models initiated by Shimer (2005). The latter author emphasized the inability of the canonical search and
matching model to produce realistic unemployment  uctuations (the so-called ’unemployment volatility puzzle’).
An extensive literature has subsequently suggested a number of mechanisms aimed at amplifying unemployment
 uctuations in search models. While this paper is not aimed at addressing the unemployment volatility puzzle,
it does illustrate that real rigidities provide an amplication mechanism in the context of New Keynesian models
with search frictions.
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is the entire expected path of hours per employee (due to the on-going nature of jobs), a certain
increase in the volatility of hours per employee produces a more than proportional increase
in the volatility of employment; the same eect implies that the increase in (un)employment
volatility takes place also relative to output. Notice that these labor market eects are indirect,
as they operate through the increased sluggishness of prices produced by the  attening of the
New Keynesian Phillips curve. I conclude that integrating search frictions and staggered price
adjustment at the rm level has important payos in terms of labor market  uctuations, while
increasing only slightly the model’s complexity.
Other papers have departed from the producer-retailer assumption in the context of New
Keynesian models with search and matching frictions. A notable example is Krause and Lubik
(2007). These authors assume quadratic costs of price adjustment, rather than staggered price
adjustment. As a result, price decisions are symmetric across rms. Since all real prices are one,
the real rigidity eect is absent in such a framework.5 More closely related is the independent
work of Sveen and Weinke (2009) and Kuester (2010). Sveen and Weinke (2009) identify a
real rigidity mechanism similar to the one analyzed here. Our papers dier mainly in focus:
whereas Sveen and Weinke (2009) emphasize the implications of strategic complementarities
in price setting and of real wage stickiness for in ation dynamics, I stress the consequences
of real price rigidities for the cyclical behavior of the labor market. Kuester’s (2010) model
features rm-worker pairs where both nominal prices and wages are bargained in a staggered
fashion.6 This gives rise to real rigidities in prices as well as in wages, the latter eect amplifying
 uctuations in unemployment. The mechanism is therefore dierent from the one presented
here, which does not rely on staggered wage bargaining. Our papers also dier in terms of scope.
Kuester incorporates a number of additional frictions (habit formation, price indexation and
wage indexation) and estimates the model using a number of US macroeconomic time series.
5Krause and Lubik (2007) focus their analysis on the relevance of real wage rigidity for in ation dynamics.
6Notice that, in the model proposed here, rms are assumed to employ many workers, which realistically
allows them to change both margins of labor over time.
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Instead, I compare two calibrated search and matching models where monopolistic competition
and staggered price-setting are the only additional frictions, with the purpose of isolating the
eect of the real price rigidities on equilibrium dynamics.
This paper is also related to previous analyses of how the specicity of labor can give rise
to real rigidities in New Keynesian models. In particular, Woodford (2003, Ch. 3) considers
a setup of industry-specic labor markets where rms in each industry hire labor at that
industry’s perfectly competitive wage. This generates upward-sloping marginal cost curves
at the industry level and hence real rigidities. This paper considers instead a framework in
which the search frictions that characterize the labor market give rise endogenously to long-run
employment relationships, thus making labor specic to each rm.
There also exists a parallel between the real rigidity mechanism studied in this paper and
the one arising in models of rm-specic capital (Sveen and Weinke, 2005; Woodford, 2005; and
Altig et al., 2004). Here, the employment stock plays an analogous role to the capital stock in
the latter class of models, namely that of being a rm-specic endogenous state variable. This
implies similar complications in rms’ price-setting decisions, because the latter interact with
forward-looking hiring decisions (here) or investment decisions (in rm-specic capital models)
in a non-trivial manner. In order to solve for pricing decisions, I use Woodford’s (2005) solution
method, which he develops in the context of a model with rm-specic capital. Regarding the
nature of the real rigidity mechanism, in both cases the latter arises because the rm’s marginal
cost curve becomes upward-sloping, although for dierent reasons. In the case of rm-specic
capital, marginal costs slope upwards due to decreasing marginal returns to labor for a given
capital stock. Here, it is due to increasing marginal disutility of labor and hence increasing
marginal wages.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
shows how to solve for individual pricing decisions in this framework, using Woodford’s (2005)
methodology. I then derive the New Keynesian Phillips curve and analyze the eect of real
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rigidities on equilibrium dynamics. Section 4 calibrates the model and provides a quantitative
assessment of the theoretical mechanisms. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
I now present a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the labor market.
The model therefore brings together two frameworks that have become the standard for an-
alyzing the monetary transmission mechanism and the cyclical behavior of the labor market,
respectively. The main dierence with respect to previous models of this type is that I do
not separate the rms making the pricing decisions from the rms that face search frictions.
Instead, I consider a single set of rms which set prices and post vacancies in a labor market
characterized by search frictions.
2.1 The matching function
The search frictions in the labor market are represented by a matching function, p(yw> xw),
where yw is the total number of vacancies and xw is the total number of unemployed workers.
Normalizing the labor force to 1, xw also represents the unemployment rate. The function p is
strictly increasing and strictly concave in both arguments. Assuming constant returns to scale
in the matching function,7 the matching probabilities for unemployed workers, p(yw> xw)@xw =
p (yw@xw> 1), and for vacancies,p(yw> xw)@yw = p (1> xw@yw), are functions of the ratio of vacancies
to unemployment, also known as labor market tightness. I denote the latter by w  yw@xw. In
what follows, I let s (w)  p (w> 1) denote the matching probability for unemployed workers.
The latter is an increasing function of w: in a tighter labor market, job-seekers are more likely
to nd jobs. Similarly, I let t (w)  p (1> 1@w) denote the matching probability for vacancies.
The latter is decreasing in w: rms are less likely to ll their vacancies in a tighter labor market.
7See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for empirical evidence of constant returns to scale in the matching
function for several industrialized economies.
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2.2 Households
In the presence of unemployment risk, we may observe dierences in consumption levels be-
tween employed and unemployed consumers. However, under the assumption of perfect insur-
ance markets, consumption is equalized across consumers. This is equivalent to assuming the
existence of a large representative household, as in Merz (1995). In this household, a fraction
qw of its members are employed in a measure-one continuum of rms. The remaining fraction
xw = 1 qw search for jobs. All members pool their income so as to ensure equal consumption
across members. Household welfare is given by
Kw = x(fw) qwe
Z 1
0
qlw
k1+lw
1 + 
gl+ HwKw+1> (1)
where qlw and klw represent the number of workers and hours per worker respectively in rm
l 5 [0> 1], e is labor disutility unrelated to klw (forgone utility from home production, commuting
time, etc.), and
fw 
μZ 1
0
f
31

lw gl
¶ 
31
is the Dixit-Stiglitz consumption basket, where  A 1 measures the elasticity of substitution
across dierentiated goods. Cost minimization implies that the nominal cost of consumption
is given by Swfw, where
Sw 
μZ 1
0
S 13lw gl
¶ 1
13
is the corresponding price index. The household’s budget constraint is given by
Pw31 +Uw31Ew31 + Ww
Sw
+
Z 1
0
qlwzlw(klw)gl+w  fw +
Ew +Pw
Sw
> (2)
where Pw31 and Ew31 are holdings of money and one-period nominal bonds, respectively, Uw31
is the gross nominal interest rate, Ww are net cash transfers from the government, zlw(klw) is the
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wage income earned by workers in rm l as a function of hours worked, and w =
R 1
0
lwgl are
aggregate real prots, which are reverted to households in a lump-sum manner.
Employed members separate from their jobs at the exogenous rate , whereas unemployed
members nd jobs at the rate s(w). Therefore, the household’s employment rate evolves ac-
cording to the following law of motion,
qw+1 = (1 )qw + s(w)(1 qw)= (3)
It is useful at this point to nd the utility that the marginal worker in rm l contributes to the
household. Equations (1), (2) and (3), together with qw =
R 1
0
qlwgl, imply that
CKw
Cqlw
= x0(fw)zlw(klw) e
k1+lw
1 + 
 s(w)
Z 1
0
ymw
yw
Hw
CKw+1
Cqmw+1
gm + (1 )Hw
CKw+1
Cqlw+1
> (4)
where s(w)ymw@yw is the probability that an unemployed member is matched to rm m 5 [0> 1].
The right hand side of equation (4) consists of the real wage (in utility units), minus labor
disutility and outside opportunities, plus the continuation value of the job.
I assume the existence of a standard cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on the purchase of
consumption goods.8 Assuming that goods markets open after the closing of nancial markets,
the household’s nominal expenditure in consumption cannot exceed the amount of cash left
after bond transactions have taken place,
Swfw Pw31 + Ww Ew= (5)
Cash transfers are given by Ww =Pvw Pvw31, wherePvw is exogenous money supply. The growth
rate of money supply, w  log(Pvw @Pvw31), follows an AR(1) process, w = pw31 + %pw , where
8I use the CIA specication for aggregate demand in order to simplify the exposition of the main mechanisms.
Section 4.3.2 considers alternative demand specications, such as money in the utility function (MIU) or a
Taylor rule for the nominal interest rate. All the main qualitative results regarding the eects of real rigidities
on in ation and labor market volatility are invariant to these alternative specications.
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%pw is an iid shock. Assuming that the net nominal interest rate (i.e. the opportunity cost of
holding money) is always positive, equation (5) holds with equality. In equilibrium, money
demand equals money supply, Pw =Pvw , which implies Pw31 + Ww =Pw. Combining this with
(5) and the fact that bonds are in zero net supply (Ew = 0), I obtain
Swfw =Pw= (6)
2.3 Firms
The value of rm l 5 [0> 1] in period w is given by
Ylw =
Slw
Sw
|glw  zlw(klw)qlw 
"
x0(fw)
ylw +Hww>w+1Ylw+1>
where Slw and |glw are the rm’s nominal price and real sales, respectively, ylw are vacan-
cies posted in period w, " is the utility cost for the management of posting a vacancy and
w>W  
W3wx0(fW )@x0(fw) is the stochastic discount factor between periods w and W  w. Due to
imperfect substitutability among individual goods, the rm faces the following demand curve
for its product,
|glw =
μ
Slw
Sw
¶3
|w> (7)
where aggregate demand is given by |w = fw. The rm’s production technology is given by
|vlw = Dwqlwklw>
where Dw is an exogenous labor productivity process. The log of the latter, dw  logDw, follows
an AR(1) process, dw = ddw31+ %dw , where %dw is an iid shock. Once the rm has chosen a price,
it commits to supplying whatever amount is demanded at that price, |vlw = |glw. This requires
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the following condition to hold at all times,
μ
Slw
Sw
¶3
|w = Dwqlwklw= (8)
In each period, the individual rm posts a number ylw of vacancies. Assuming that rms are
large,  and t(w) are the fraction of workers that separate from the rm and the fraction of
vacancies that the rm lls, respectively. Due to the time involved in searching for suitable
workers and (possibly) training them, new hires become productive in the following period.
Therefore, the rm’s workforce, qlw, is given at the start of the period. The law of motion of
the rm’s employment stock is given by
qlw+1 = (1 )qlw + t(w)ylw= (9)
Let pflw and !lw denote the Lagrange multipliers with respect to constraints (8) and (9), re-
spectively. Therefore, pflw represents the real marginal cost of production. The rm chooses
the state-contingent path {klw> ylw> qlw+1}"w=0 that maximizes
H0
"P
w=0
0>w
;
A?
A=
(Slw@Sw)13 |w  zlw(klw)qlw  "ylw@x0(fw) +pflw
£
Dwqlwklw  (Slw@Sw)3 |w
¤
+!lw [(1 )qlw + t(w)ylw  qlw+1]
<
A@
A>
=
The rst-order conditions are given by
pflw =
z0lw(klw)
Dw
> (10)
"
x0(fw)
= t(w)!lw> (11)
!lw = Hww>w+1
£
pflw+1Dw+1klw+1  zlw+1(klw+1) + (1 )!lw+1
¤
= (12)
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According to equation (10), the real marginal cost is given by the ratio between the real mar-
ginal wage, z0lw(klw), and the marginal product of labor, Dw. Intuitively, since employment is
predetermined, the rm needs to raise hours per employee in order to increase production. This
comes at a marginal cost of z0lw(klw) per employee. Equation (11) says that the marginal cost
of posting a vacancy must equal the probability that the vacancy is lled times the expected
value of an additional worker in the following period. The latter, from equation (12), is given
by the expected marginal reduction in the rm’s cost, minus the expected wage to be paid to
the new hire, plus her continuation value for the rm.
2.3.1 Wage bargaining
I assume Nash wage bargaining between the rm and each individual worker. Both the rm
and the worker enjoy an economic surplus from their employment relationship. The worker’s
surplus in consumption units, which I denote by Vzlw  (CKw@Cqlw) @x0(fw), is given by equation
(4) divided by x0(fw), that is,
Vzlw = zlw(klw)
e+ k1+lw @(1 + )
x0(fw)
 s(w)
Z 1
0
ymw
yw
Hww>w+1V
z
mw+1gm + (1 )Hww>w+1V
z
lw+1= (13)
On the rm’s side, the surplus obtained from the marginal worker is given by
Vilw = pflwDwklw  zlw(klw) + (1 )Hww>w+1V
i
lw+1= (14)
The term pflwDwklw is the marginal increase in costs that the rm would have to incur if the
employee walked away from the job. Since the rm is demand-constrained, it would have to
make up for the lost production, Dwklw, by raising working hours for all other employees, which
comes at a cost of pflwDwklw. Therefore, the contribution of the marginal worker to  ow prots
is given, not by the marginal revenue product of the worker (as in standard RBC models), but
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by the marginal reduction in the wage bill.9
Let  denote the rm’s bargaining power. Nash bargaining implies the following surplus-
sharing rule,
(1 )Vilw = V
z
lw = (15)
Combining this with (13) and (14), I obtain the following wage agreement,
zlw(klw) = (1 )pflwDwklw + 

e+ k1+lw @(1 + )
x0(fw)
+ s(w)
Z 1
0
ymw
yw
Hww>w+1Vzmw+1gm
¸
= (16)
Therefore, the worker receives a weighted average of her contribution to cost reduction and
the opportunity cost of holding the job (the sum of labor disutility and outside options). It is
possible to simplify the equation (16). Notice rst that, from equations (12) and (14), it follows
that !lw = Hww>w+1V
i
lw+1. This, together with equations (11) and (15), implies that
Z 1
0
ymw
yw
Hww>w+1Vzmw+1gm =
1 

Z 1
0
ymw
yw
Hww>w+1V
i
mw+1gm =
1 

"
t(w)x0(fw)
=
Inserting this into equation (16), and using the fact that s(w)@t(w) = w, I nally obtain
zlw(klw) = (1 )

pflwDwklw +
"
x0(fw)
w
¸
+ 

e+ k1+lw @(1 + )
x0(fw)
¸
= (17)
2.3.2 Vacancy posting
Combining the rst-order conditions (11) and (12), and the real wage schedule, equation (17),
I obtain the following expression for the vacancy-posting decision,
"
t(w)
= Hw
(

"
x0(fw+1)pflw+1Dw+1klw+1  e
k1+lw+1
1 + 
#
 (1 )"w+1 + (1 )
"
t(w+1)
)
=
(18)
9This result is analogous to the one in Woodford’s (2005) model of rm-specic capital, where the marginal
contribution of capital to  ow prots is given by the marginal reduction in the wage bill, rather than the
marginal revenue product of capital.
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The real wage schedule, equation (17), implies the following real marginal wage,
z0lw(klw) = (1 )pflwDw + 
klw
x0(fw)
=
Using this to substitute for z0lw(klw) in equation (10), I can express the real marginal cost in
terms of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor,
pflw =
klw@x0(fw)
Dw
= (19)
Using this in equation (18), I nally obtain
"
t(w)
= Hw


μ

1 + 
k1+lw+1  e
¶
 (1 )"w+1 + (1 )
"
t(w+1)
¸
= (20)
According to equation (20), the rm’s incentives to hire are driven by  uctuations in the
expected path of hours per employee. Intuitively, if the rm expects hours to be higher in the
future, it also expects larger reductions in its wage bill from having additional workers. This
leads the rm to post more vacancies today, up to the point in which the expected marginal
benet of hiring equals its marginal cost, "@t(w).10
2.3.3 Pricing decision
As is standard in the New Keynesian literature, I use the Calvo (1983) model of staggered
price setting. Each period, a randomly selected fraction  of rms cannot change their price.
Therefore,  represents the probability that a rm is not able to change its price in the following
10Notice that, if one were to assume instantaneous hiring instead of time-to-hire (hence replacing equation
9 by qlw = (1  )qlw1 + t(w)ylw), the resulting job creation condition would feature current hours, rather
than expected hours (as in equation 20). Under the maintained assumption of linear hiring costs, hours per
worker would then be equalized across rms, klw = kw for all l. Since marginal costs under instantaneous hiring
would still be given by equation (19), the latter would also be equalized across rms, pflw = pfw for all l, thus
implying the absence of real rigidities.
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period. At any time w, the part of the rm’s value that depends on its current price is given by
H0
"X
W=w
W3ww>W
(μ
Slw
SW
¶13
|W pflW |w
μ
Slw
SW
¶3
|W
)
> (21)
where the subscript W |w denotes period-W values conditional on the rm not having reset its
price since period w. Therefore, pflW |w is the rm’s real marginal cost in period W conditional
on the price Slw being still in place. When a rm has the chance to reset its price, it chooses
Slw so as to maximize (21). The rst order condition is given by
Hw
"X
W=w
W3ww>WS

W |W
μ
S Wlw
SW


  1
pflW |w
¶
= 0> (22)
where S Wlw is the pricing decision. Using the expression for real marginal cost, equation (19),
and the fact that hours must adjust in order for the rm to meet demand, klw = |lw@(Dwqlw), I
can express pflW |w as a function of the rm’s output in period W ,
pflW |w =
μ
|lW |w
DWqlW |w
¶
1
x0(fW )DW
> (23)
where |lW |w = (S Wlw@SW )
3 |W . Equation (23) implies that, under the assumption of convex labor
disutility ( A 0), the rm’s marginal cost curve is an increasing function of its own output
level.
3 Log-linear equilibrium dynamics
Following standard practice in the New Keynesian literature, I now perform a log-linear ap-
proximation of the equilibrium conditions around a zero-in ation steady state. This will allow
me to obtain the law of motion of in ation, also known as the ’New Keynesian Phillips curve’.
At this point, I assume the following functional forms for the utility function and the matching
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function,
x(f) =
f1331
1 31
>
p(y> x) = )yx13>
where > ) A 0 and  5 (0> 1). In terms of notation, I will use ’hats’ to denote log-deviations
of a certain variable from its steady-state value, and ’tildes’ to denote log-deviations of that
variable from its cross-sectional average.
3.1 Relative dynamics of the rm
Log-linearization of the rm’s pricing decision, equation (22), yields
logS Wlw = (1 )Hw
"X
W=w
()W3w
£cpflW |w + logSW ¤ = (24)
Equation (23) implies that the real marginal cost in period W  w of a rm that has not changed
its price since period w can be expressed as
cpflW |w = cpfW + (|ˆlW |w  |ˆW ) q˜lW |w> (25)
where
|ˆlW |w = |ˆW  (logS Wlw  logSW ) (26)
and cpfW is the average real marginal cost. Notice that a rm’s relative marginal cost is
decreasing in its relative stock of workers, q˜lW |w. Having more workers allows the rm to
produce a certain amount of output with a smaller number of hours per worker, which reduces
the marginal labor disutility of its workers and hence the marginal real wage. I now combine
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(24), (25) and (26) to obtain
(1 + ) logS Wlw = (1 )Hw
"X
W=w
()W3w
£cpfW + (1 + ) logSW  q˜lW |w¤ = (27)
This expression for a rm’s pricing decision is very similar to the one produced by a standard
New Keynesian model.11 The only dierence is the presence of the Hwq˜lW |w terms, which re ect
the fact that a rm’s marginal cost is decreasing in its stock of workers. These additional
terms complicate the analysis in the following way. In order to determine logS Wlw, we need to
compute the expected path of q˜lW |w. The latter however depends on the rm’s current and
future expected vacancy posting decisions, which in turn depend on the price chosen today.
Solving for the rm’s pricing decision therefore requires that one considers the eect of a rm’s
relative price on the evolution of its relative employment stock.
With this purpose, I now follow Woodford’s (2005) method to solve for the rm’s relative
dynamics.12 I start by noticing that, in a log-linear approximation, the rm’s pricing decision
is a linear function of the state of the economy and its individual state, qˆlw. On the other hand,
since price-setters are randomly chosen, their average employment stock coincides with the
economy-wide average employment stock. Therefore, it is plausible to guess that a rm’s pricing
decision, relative to the average pricing decision, is proportional to its relative employment
stock,
logS Wlw = logS
W
w  
Wq˜lw= (28)
I now log-linearize the vacancy posting decision, equation (20), and rescale the resulting ex-
pression by x0(f)|@q to obtain
vy

(1 )ˆw = Hw




kˆlw+1 +
μ
1 
1 
1 
s()
¶
vy

(1 )ˆw+1
¸
> (29)
11See e.g. Walsh (2003, chap. 3).
12Woodford (2005) develops his method in the context of a model where capital, rather than labor, is specic
to each individual rm.
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where vy  ["@x0(f)] y@| is vacancy posting costs over GDP in the steady state and   @(1)
is the monopolistic mark-up.13 Notice that the only idiosyncratic term in equation (29) is
Hwkˆlw+1. The latter depends on Slw (by aecting the rm’s demand in w+ 1 should it not reset
its price) as well as on its stock of workers at the beginning of w+1. It is now possible to obtain
the following result.14
Proposition 1 Let relative pricing decisions be given by equation (28), up to a log-linear ap-
proximation. Then the relative employment stock of any rm evolves according to
q˜lw+1 = q (logSlw  logSw) > (30)
where
q =

1 (1 ) W
= (31)
Intuitively, rms with a higher price in the current period also expect to have a higher price
in the next period, which means that they also expect lower demand. Anticipating this, such
rms post a number of vacancies that leaves them with a smaller workforce than the average
rm in the following period. Proposition 1 allows me to write
Hw
"X
W=w
()W3wq˜lW |w = q˜lw + Hw
"X
W=w
()W3wq˜lW+1|w
= q˜lw  qHw
"X
W=w
()W3w (logS Wlw  logSW ) = (32)
Using (32) in equation (27), I can write the rm’s pricing decision as
(1 + !) logS Wlw = (1 )Hw
"X
W=w
()W3w [cpfW + (1 + !) logSW ] (1 )q˜lw> (33)
13In the derivation of equation (29), I use the steady-state relations k = x0(f)pfD (equation 19 in the
steady-state), pf = 1@ (derived from equation 22) and k = |@ (Dq). I have also used the fact that, in the
steady state, t()y = q.
14The proofs of all propositions are in the Appendix.
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where !    q. Averaging (33) across price-setters, and using the fact that the latter
are randomly chosen, I obtain
(1 + !) logS Ww = (1 )Hw
"X
W=w
()W3w [cpfW + (1 + !) logSW ] = (34)
Substracting (34) from (33) yields (1 + !)(logS Wlw logS Ww ) = (1 )q˜lw. This is consistent
with my initial guess, equation (28), only if
 W =
(1 )
1 +   q
= (35)
Therefore, if relative pricing decisions and relative employment stocks are to have a solution,
the latter is given by equations (28) and (30), respectively, where the parameters  W and q
must satisfy equations (31) and (35). The following result establishes that such a solution exists
and is unique.
Proposition 2 The rm’s relative employment stock evolves according to equation (30), where
the parameter q A 0 is given by equation (31). A price-setter’s price decision, relative to the
average price decision, is given by equation (28), where
 W =
e
s
e2  4df
2d
A 0>
d  (1 + )(1 ) A 0>
e   [1 + (2   )] ? 0>
f  (1 ) A 0=
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3.2 Real rigidities and in ation dynamics
I am now ready to discuss the presence of real rigidities in this framework and how they aect
in ation dynamics. The average pricing decision, equation (34), can be written as
(1 + !) logS Ww = (1 ) [cpfw + (1 + !) logSw] + Hw(1 + !) logS Ww+1= (36)
In the Calvo model of staggered price-setting, the law of motion for the price level is given
by S 13w = S
13
w31 + (1 ) (S Ww )
13. The latter admits the following log-linear approximation,
logS Ww  logSw = [@ (1 )]w, where w  log(Sw@Sw31) is the in ation rate. Combining this
with (36), I obtain the following New Keynesian Phillips curve,
w = cpfw + Hww+1> (37)
where
 
(1 )(1 )

1
1 + !
> (38)
!    q= (39)
The parameter ! has two components,  and q. The term  re ects the existence in
this framework of strategic complementarities in price-setting, also known as real rigidities after
Ball and Romer (1990). This mechanism has the eect of slowing down the adjustment of the
overall price level in response to  uctuations in average real marginal costs. To see this, take
a price-setter that is considering a reduction in its price. Given the prices of other rms, a
reduction in the rm’s nominal price represents also a reduction in its real price. This increases
its sales (with elasticity ) and therefore, given its employment stock, the required amount of
hours per worker. This increases the rm’s marginal costs through the increase in workers’
marginal disutility of labor (with elasticity ). The anticipated rise in its current and future
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expected marginal costs leads the rm to choose a smaller price cut than the one initially
considered. Therefore, the fact that some rms keep their prices unchanged leads price-setters
to change theirs by little, hence the ’strategic complementarity’ in price-setting. Equivalently,
price-setters have an incentive to keep their prices in line with the overall price level, hence
the ’real rigidity’ in prices. Because all price-setters follow the same logic, the price level and
therefore in ation become less sensitive to changes in average real marginal costs.
The term q re ects the fact that the position of a rm’s marginal cost curve depends
on its stock of workers, by aecting how many hours per worker are needed to produce a
certain amount of output. This has the eect of accelerating price adjustment. To see this,
take the same rm considering a price cut. From Proposition 1, today’s price cut leads the
rm to expect a larger relative employment stock and, by equation (25) a lower marginal cost
in future periods. Holding everything else constant, this would lead the rm to choose an even
larger price cut than initially considered. It is possible to show however that this latter eect
is dominated by the real rigidity eect. Using the denition of q, equation (31), I can write
  q =   
μ

1 (1 ) W
¶
= 
μ
1
2
1 (1 ) W
¶
=
The latter expression is positive only if the expression in brackets is. The Appendix shows that
 W must be smaller than 1@ in order for the model to have convergent dynamics. This implies
that
1
2
1 (1 ) W
A 1
2
1 (1 ) 1
= 1  A 0=
It follows that ! A 0. Therefore, the real rigidities in price-setting that arise under search
frictions unambiguously  atten the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
It is interesting to note the parallelism between the real rigidity mechanism just explained
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and the one arising in models of rm-specic capital (Sveen and Weinke, 2005; Woodford,
2005; and Altig et al., 2004). In the present framework, the rm’s employment stock plays an
analogous role to the capital stock in models of rm-specic capital, namely that of being a
rm-specic endogenous state variable. In the latter class of models, rms are able to adjust
production in the short run by varying their labor input; here, they adjust production by
varying the number of hours worked by their employees. In both cases, real rigidities arise
because the rm’s marginal cost curve becomes upward-sloping. In the case of rm-specic
capital, this is due to decreasing marginal returns to labor for a given capital stock, although
such an eect may be reinforced by the existence of industry-specic labor markets (see e.g.
Woodford, 2005). Here, it is due to increasing marginal disutility of labor and hence increasing
marginal wages.15
3.3 Aggregate equilibrium
Equilibrium in the search model with real rigidities is characterized by the AR(1) processes for
exogenous money growth and labor productivity, together with the following six equations,
w = cpfw + Hww+1> (E1)
cpfw = kˆw + 31|ˆw  dw> (E2)
15It is interesting to compare the slope of the NKPC in this framework with the one that arises in a model
of rm-specic capital. As shown by Woodford (2005), the slope coe!cient in such a model can be expressed
again as in equation (38), with the parameter ! replaced by
!ivn 
μ


+
1 

¶
 

1 ˜
μ


+
1 

 
¶
˜ >
where 1   is the capital elasticity in a Cobb-Douglas production function, and both ˜ and ˜ are func-
tions of structural parameters. The interpretation of !ivn is analogous to that of !: the rst component,
(@+ (1 ) @) , captures the real rigidity eect, where decreasing returns to labor ( ? 1) add to convex
labor disutility ( A 0) as a source of strategic complementarities. The second term captures the fact that the
position of the marginal cost curve depends on the capital stock. While a comparative analysis of rm-specic
capital and search frictions as sources of real rigidities would be an interesting exploration, such a comparison
is however beyond the scope of this paper.
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|ˆw = |ˆw31 + w  w> (E3)
vy

(1 )ˆw = Hw




kˆw+1 +
μ
1 
1 
1 
s()
¶
vy

(1 )ˆw+1
¸
> (E4)
kˆw = |ˆw  dw  qˆw (E5)
qˆw+1 = (1  s())qˆw + ˆw= (E6)
Equation (E2) is obtained by log-linearizing (19), averaging across all rms and using the fact
that fˆw = |ˆw. Equation (E3) is obtained by log-linearizing (6), taking rst dierences and using
again fˆw = |ˆw. Equation (E4) is obtained by averaging equation (29) across rms.16 Equation
(E5) is the log-linear version of the rm’s production function, after averaging across rms.
Finally, equation (E6) is the log-linear approximation of equation (3), where I also use the
steady-state condition q = s()(1  q). This log-linear representation allows to understand
easily the eect of shocks on the economy. In response to a positive monetary shock (an increase
in w in equation E3), aggregate demand increases, which puts upward pressure on real marginal
costs and in ation. To the extent that the increase in demand is persistent, rms anticipate
longer hours per employee in the future. In order to avoid large pay rises for existing employees,
rms post more vacancies. This results in a tightening of the labor market (equation E4) and
an increase in total employment (equation E6). In response to a positive productivity shock
(an increase in dw), real marginal costs fall and so does in ation. For a constant level of nominal
GDP, the fall in prices produces an expansion in aggregate demand (equation E3). The eect
on employment is however ambiguous. If the expansion in output is strong enough relative to
the increase in dw, rms expect hours per employee to be higher, which leads them to post more
vacancies and thus increase employment. If the increase in output is weak enough, the opposite
will be true.
16As shown in the Proof of Proposition 1, in the Appendix, Hwkˆlw+1 can be written as Hwkˆw+1  S˜lw 
[1 (1 )] q˜lw+1, which averages to Hwkˆw+1.
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3.3.1 Comparison to a search model with a producer-retailer structure
Most of the literature on New Keynesian models with search and matching frictions separates
vacancy-posting and pricing decisions by assuming a producer-retailer structure, in which the
former are subject to search frictions and the latter to staggered price-setting. While simplifying
the analysis, this assumption eliminates from the outset the possibility of analyzing price-setting
decisions in an environment in which price-setters cannot adjust employment costlessly and
instantaneously. In such models, producers produce a homogenous intermediate good that is
sold to retailers at a perfectly competitive real price. We may denote the latter by pfw. Each
retailer then transforms the intermediate good into a dierentiated nal good using a linear
technology. Therefore, pfw represents the real marginal cost common to all retailers.
It is relatively straightforward to construct a model with this kind of producer-retailer
structure that is otherwise equivalent to the model presented in section 2. In particular, I may
assume that household preferences and the production function of producers are the same as
in the model with real rigidities. The Appendix derives the equilibrium conditions in such a
model. Once the producer-retailer model is log-linearized, the New Keynesian Phillips curve is
given by
w = sucpfw + Hww+1> (40)
where
su 
(1 )(1 )

A =
Therefore, the New Keynesian Phillips curve in the model with a producer-retailer structure is
steeper than in the model with real rigidities. Because retailers can buy as much intermediate
input as they need at the perfectly competitive price pfw, their pricing decisions have no eect
on their own marginal costs. As a result, the real rigidity eect disappears.
As shown in the Appendix, the remaining log-linear equilibrium conditions in the producer-
retailer model are exactly the same as in the model with real rigidities, equations (E2) to (E6).
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The producer-retailer model thus serves as a ’control’ that allows me to isolate the eect of real
rigidities in models with search frictions and staggered price-setting. One important dimension
of this comparison is the dierence in in ation dynamics between both models. Real rigidities
have the property of slowing down the adjustment of the price level in response to dierent
shocks, for a given degree of nominal price rigidity (). As a result, the in ation response to
shocks will be smaller on impact and more persistent in the model with real rigidities. This
eect is shared in general by models that incorporate a real-rigidity mechanism, such as the
New Keynesian model with rm-specic capital introduced by Sveen and Weinke (2005) and
Woodford (2005), and further analyzed by Altig et al. (2004).17
More importantly, this comparison allows to measure the extent to which real rigidities aect
the model’s behavior along those labor market dimensions that the standard New Keynesian
model is not designed to address, such as unemployment, employment and hours per employee.
Take for instance a positive money growth shock. Ceteris paribus, the slower response of the
price level in the presence of real rigidities leads to a larger increase in aggregate demand. To
the extent that the economic expansion is expected to persist, rms expect larger increases
in hours per employee. Since the latter are the driving force of job creation, real rigidities
generate a larger rise in job creation and therefore a larger drop in unemployment. The next
section will show that real rigidities also amplify the unemployment response to productivity
shocks. Therefore, real rigidities amplify the unconditional  uctuations in employment and
unemployment. Furthermore, because employment relationships have a long-term nature in
this framework, rms base their hiring decisions on the entire expected path of hours per
employee, such that a small increase in the latter’s volatility is enough to generate a large
increase in employment volatility. Therefore, real rigidities also have the property of increasing
the volatility of employment relative to that of hours per employee. The same eect implies that
17As argued by Woodford (2005) and Altig et al. (2004), estimates of New Keynesian models (or New
Keynesian Phillips curves) that abstract from real rigidities imply average durations of nominal price contracts
that are too long when compared with actual micro data. These authors propose rm-specic capital, and the
resulting real rigidities, as a way for econometric estimates to imply more realistic durations of price contracts.
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the amplication of (un)employment  uctuations takes place not just in absolute terms, but
also relative to those in output. I now turn to the quantitative assessment of these mechanisms.
4 Quantitative analysis
4.1 Calibration
Following most of the literature on search and matching models, I calibrate the model to
monthly US data. As in most of the RBC literature, I set the discount factor to 4% per
quarter, or  = 0=991@3. I also choose a standard value for the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution,  = 1. It is customary to set 1@ on the basis of micro estimates of labor supply
elasticities. According to Card’s (1994) review of the empirical literature, this elasticity is
surely no higher than 0.5. I therefore set  to 2 as a conservative choice.18
Regarding the New Keynesian side of the model, following the evidence in Bils and Klenow
(2004) I assume that rms change prices every 1.5 quarters, or 4.5 months, which implies
 = (4=5 1) @4=5 = 0=78. As in Woodford (2005), I choose a monopolistic mark-up of  = 1=15,
which implies an elasticity of substitution among dierentiated goods of  = @ (1 ) = 7=67.
Given the values of , ,  and , the parameters governing relative rm dynamics are given
by W = 0=08 and q = 6=90. From (39), the parameter measuring (net) real rigidity equals
! = 4=63. From (38), the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve equals  = 0=011. This
compares with a slope of su = 0=064 in the producer-retailer model.
The parameters that describe the labor market are calibrated as follows. Following Shimer
(2005), I set the monthly separation probability, , to 0.035. Shimer (2008) and Pissarides
(2009) calculate an average job-nding probability and an average vacancies-to-unemployment
ratio of 0.286 and 0.72, respectively, for the US. I therefore target the steady-state values
18Notice that a lower labor supply elasticity (that is, a higher ) would actually strengthen the real rigidity
eect, by reducing further the slope of the in ation equation. It is in this sense that  = 2 is chosen as a
conservative calibration.
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s () = 0=30 and  = 0=72. The elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies,
, is set to 0.6, following the evidence in Blanchard and Diamond (1989). This, together with
s () = ) and the targets for s () and , imply ) = 0=365. Following standard practice in
the literature, I set the bargaining power parameter, , equal to . Notice however that 
does not aect the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Finally, following Andolfatto
(1996), Gertler and Trigari (2009) and Blanchard and Galí (2010), I target a steady-state ratio
of vacancy-posting costs to GDP, vy, of 1 per cent. With log utility, this requires setting the
utility cost of posting a vacancy to " = 0=133.19 One can then use the steady-state job creation
condition to solve for the xed component of labor disutility, obtaining e = 0=563.20
The shock parameters are calibrated as follows. Following Shimer (2005), the parameters of
the labor productivity process are calibrated in a model-consistent way. Aggregating equation
(8) across rms, we have that Dw = |w{w@(qwkw), where kw  q31w
R
qlwklwgl are average hours
per employee and {w 
R
(Slw@Sw)3 gl is a price-dispersion term that experiences second-order
 uctuations around one (Woodford, 2003, Ch. 6). We thus have logDw = log |w log(qwkw), up
to a rst-order approximation. Using BLS data for real output (|w) and total hours (qwkw) to
construct a quarterly series for log labor productivity, I obtain an autocorrelation coe!cient
and a standard deviation for the corresponding monthly process of d = 0=86 and d = 0=56%,
respectively.21 As in Krause and Lubik (2007), I set the autocorrelation coe!cient of the money
growth process to 0.49 on a quarterly basis, or p = 0=491@3 on a monthly basis. Finally, the
19From the denition of vy, we have that " = vy|x0(f)@y = vy@y = vy@ (x), where I have used x0(f) = 1@f,
f = |, and y = x. The values of s() and  imply a steady-state unemployment rate of x = @ (+ s()) =
0=1045, with together with vy = 0=01 and  = 0=72 implies " = 0=133.
20In using equation (20) in the steady state to solve for e, I also use the fact that (  1) @ = pf = k|@D =
k1+q, which implies k = [(  1) @ (q)]1@(1+), where q = 1 x = 0=8955.
Notice that there are no unemployment benets in the model (consumers are perfectly insured as a result of
the large household assumption). However, the steady-state ratio between the real value of total labor disutility,£
e+ k1+@ (1 + )
¤
@x0(f), and worker output, |@q, can be interpreted as an (endogenous) counterpart to the
unemployment payo parameter in the standard search and matching model. Under my calibration, the latter
ratio equals 0.794, which is in between the values of the above-mentioned parameter used by Shimer (0=40) and
Hagedorn-Manovskii (0=955), and similar to the value 0=71 used by Hall and Milgrom (2008) and Pissarides
(2009).
21See section 4.3 for details about the data sources, the sample period and the detrending procedure.
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standard deviation of money growth shocks, p, is calibrated to match the standard deviation
of real output in the data.
Table 1. Parameter values
Value Description Target/Source
 0.991@3 discount factor standard
 1 intertemporal elast. of subs. standard
 2 convexity of labor disutility 1@ = 0=5
 0.78 fraction of sticky prices 1@ (1 ) = 4=5 months
 7.67 elasticity of demand curves @ (  1) = 1=15
 0.035 job separation rate Shimer (2005)
) 0.365 scale of matching fct. s() = 0=30>  = 0=72
 0.6 elasticity of matching fct. Blanchard-Diamond (1989)
 0.6 rm’s bargaining power  = 
" 0.133 vacancy posting cost ["@x0(f)] y@| = 0=01
e 0.56 labor disutility parameter steady-state JC condition
d 0.86 AC of productivity shock data
d 0.56% SD of productivity shock data
p 0.491@3 AC of monetary shock Krause-Lubik (2007)
p 0.47% SD of monetary shock output volatility
Reduced-form parameters
! 4.63 net real rigidity
 0.011 slope of NKPC, model with real rigidities
su 0.064 slope of NKPC, producer-retailer model (no real rigidities)
vy 0.01 vacancy posting costs/GDP
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a positive monetary shock
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
price level
real rigidities
no real rigidities
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
inflation
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
output
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
hours per employee
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
employment
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
total hours
4.2 Impulse responses
In order to illustrate graphically the eects of real rigidities on equilibrium dynamics, I now
compare the economy’s response to shocks in the model with and without real rigidities.
4.2.1 Monetary shocks
Figure 1 displays the impulse-responses of prices, in ation, output and both labor margins to
a one-standard-deviation positive shock to money growth. The real rigidity mechanism slows
down the adjustment of the price level. This is re ected in an in ation response that is both
smaller on impact and more persistent afterwards. Given the exogenous expansion in nominal
GDP, the more sluggish price adjustment leads to a larger expansion in output in the model
with real rigidities. As a result, the dynamic path of hours per employee experiences a larger
increase. Since hiring incentives are driven by  uctuations in expected hours per employee,
job creation increases more strongly under real rigidities, which leads to a larger employment
expansion.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a positive productivity shock
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4.2.2 Productivity shocks
Figure 2 displays the economy’s response to a one-standard-deviation positive shock to labor
productivity. Again, the in ation response is more muted and more persistent under real
rigidities. Since nominal GDP remains unchanged in this simulation, the extra sluggishness in
the price level leads to a weaker expansion in aggregate demand. In both models, the expansion
in aggregate demand is not strong enough to compensate for the fact that rms now need less
labor to produce the same output. As a result, total hours worked fall, the adjustment being
shared by both labor margins (hours per employee and employment).22 However, the weaker
output increase under real rigidities produces a stronger fall in total hours. Notice that the
drop in the dynamic path of hours per employee is just slightly larger when real rigidities are
present. However, because of the long-term nature of jobs in this framework, such a drop is
enough to generate a substantially larger drop in job creation and therefore in employment.
22Such an eect of productivity shocks on total hours is consistent with a large body of empirical evidence
starting with Galí (1999). It is also consistent with the predictions of estimated medium-scale DSGE models of
the US economy, such as Smets and Wouters’ (2007).
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4.3 Labor market volatility
I now analyze the extent to which real rigidities aect the empirical performance of the New
Keynesian model with search and matching frictions regarding labor market aggregates. The
second column of Table 2 displays a set of business cycle statistics in the United States. I use
seasonally-adjusted data on real output in the nonfarm business sector (|w, in model notation),
hours of all persons in the nonfarm business sector (qwkw, where kw  q31w
R 1
0
qlwklwgl are average
hours per employee), total nonfarm payroll employment (qw), number of unemployed (xw),
average hourly earnings in the private sector (zkw  (qwkw)
31 R 1
0
qlwzlw(klw)gl) and quarter-on-
quarter in ation in the Consumer Price Index (tw  logSw  logSw33), all of them from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics; I also use the Conference Board’s Help-Wanted Advertising Index
as a proxy for vacancies (yw). The sample runs from 1964:Q1 to 2008:Q2. Since output and
total hours are only available quarterly, and the data on employment, unemployment, in ation,
hourly wages and vacancies are monthly, I take quarterly averages of the latter ve series. I
then use the identities kw = (qwkw)@qw and w = yw@xw in order to obtain quarterly series for
average hours per employee and labor market tightness, respectively. All data except in ation
are logged and HP-ltered with a conventional smoothing parameter (1600). The remaining
columns of table 2 display the corresponding statistics generated by the model with and without
real rigidities.23
23Model moments are calculated as follows. I simulate 624 months of articial data. I take quarterly averages
and discard the rst 30 observations so as to eliminate the eect of initial conditions, which leaves me with 178
observations (the sample size). I then calculate the relevant second moments. I repeat this operation 200 times
and nally take averages for each vector of moments.
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Two main messages can be extracted from Table 2. First, real rigidities amplify the size of
 uctuations in employment and unemployment, both in absolute terms and relative to those
of output.24 For instance, the relative unconditional standard deviation of unemployment is
95% of its data counterpart, compared to 63% in the model without real rigidities. Similarly,
relative employment volatility is 94% of the corresponding value in the data, which contrasts
with 63% in the absence of real rigidities. As can be seen in the fth row, the eect of real
rigidities operates through the amplication of  uctuations in labor market tightness, which
is the single driving force of (un)employment  uctuations. Both models however overstate the
relative standard deviation of hours per employee by a factor of about one and a half. As a
result, the relative standard deviation of total hours is somewhat higher in the model with real
rigidities than in the data.
24Notice that amplication holds unconditionally, as well as conditional on each type of shock (to money
growth and productivity), re ecting our earlier analysis of impulse responses. Most of the amplication in
absolute volatility, (x), is due to monetary shocks, whereas most of the amplication in relative volatility,
(x)@(|), is due to productivity shocks.
Table 2. Business cycle statistics
model with real rigidities model without real rigidities
US data monetary productivity both monetary productivity both
(|w)>% 2.03 2.00 0.41 2.05 0.66 0.70 0.95
(xw)>% 10.70 9.90 2.24 10.25 2.99 0.93 3.14
(xw)@(|w) 5.28 4.95 5.46 5.00 4.53 1.33 3.31
(yw)@(|w) 6.52 5.86 9.72 6.09 6.30 2.88 4.90
(w)@(|w) 11.59 9.88 12.67 10.06 9.52 3.40 7.11
(qw)@(|w) 0.62 0.58 0.64 0.58 0.53 0.15 0.39
(kw)@(|w) 0.35 0.44 1.29 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.52
(qwkw)@(|w) 0.86 1.00 1.79 1.05 1.00 0.64 0.84
(kw)@(qw) 0.57 0.76 2.03 0.87 0.95 3.40 1.35
(zkw > |w) 0.54 0.99 0.24 0.97 0.99 0.82 0.88
(tw )>% 0.74 1.45 0.16 1.47 1.79 0.38 1.83
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Second, real rigidities increase the volatility of employment relative to that of hours per
employee. According to the model without real rigidities, the intensive margin of labor is
about one third more volatile than the extensive margin. This is clearly at odds with the data,
according to which the intensive margin is roughly half as volatile as the extensive one. By
amplifying employment  uctuations substantially, real rigidities manage to make employment
more volatile than hours per employee, even though the ratio of standard deviations is still 30
percentage points higher than in the data.25
Finally, it is interesting to discuss the implications of real rigidity for the cyclical behavior
of in ation and real wages. As shown by the last line of the table, both models overpredict
the volatility of quarter-on-quarter in ation. This is not surprising however, given the model’s
simplicity and the fact that the shock processes have been calibrated to match the cyclical
volatility of labor productivity and output.26 The relevant insight is that, for a given frequency
of price adjustment calibrated to match micro data, real rigidities work towards reducing in a-
tion volatility and hence bring it closer to the data. The  ip-side of this coin is that, if one were
to estimate both models with macro data, the average duration of price contracts implied by
the real-rigidity specication would be shorter and hence closer to the micro data.27 Similarly,
both models overpredict the cyclicality of average real wages, as measured by their contem-
poraneous correlation with output. This is of course a consequence of wages being perfectly
25While the paper’s focus is to understand the eects of search frictions and the resulting real rigidities
on equilibrium dynamics, it is also interesting to ask how other model features (such as two labor margins,
monopolistic competition and sticky prices, and monetary shocks in addition to productivity shocks) contribute
to (un)employment volatility. First, it can be showed that, in a stripped down version of the model with  exible
prices and without variations in hours per worker, unemployment is invariant to productivity shocks. This
neutrality result is analogous to the one found by Blanchard and Galí (2010) and further analyzed by Shimer
(2010). Second, the latter result continues to hold after introducing variations in the intensive margin. Third,
introducing monopolistic competition and sticky prices (while abstracting from real rigidities and monetary
shocks) produces a standard devation of unemployment of 0.93%, as shown in the second-to-last column of
Table 2. Fourth, adding monetary shocks raises unemployment volatility to 3.14% (last column). Finally,
adding real rigidities increases unemployment volatility to 10.25%. It is therefore clear from this analysis that
real rigidities are the most important factor contributing to unemployment  uctuations.
26Another way to interpret these results is that the data seems to be calling for an even longer average
duration of price contracts than the one assumed in the baseline calibration (1.5 quarters).
27See Altig et al. (2004) and Woodford (2005) for early discussions on the eects of real rigidities on the
inference of price adjustment frequencies.
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 exible in the model. While introducing some form of wage rigidity would improve the model’s
performance along this dimension, the assumption of wage  exibility allows me to isolate the
eects of real rigidities in the absence of any other amplication mechanisms.
4.3.1 Robustness: the Great Moderation period
As shown by a large number of studies, the United States seems to have experience a signicant
break in the size of its aggregate  uctuations starting approximately in 1984.28 To the extent
that such a break has aected the size of  uctuations in labor market aggregates relative to
those of output, the baseline results shown in Table 2 may be aected. For this reason, I now
calculate the same set of statistics as in Table 2 using the sample period 1984:Q1-2008:Q2,
and compare them with the corresponding statistics generated by the models. The results are
displayed in Table 3.29
28See e.g. Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000).
29The quarterly series of labor productivity since 1984 now implies an autocorrelation coe!cient and standard
deviation of the corresponding monthly process of d = 0=84 and d = 0=45, respectively. The standard deviation
of the shock to money growth is recalibrated to match again the standard deviation of output (1=13% in 1984-
2008), yielding p = 0=26%.
Table 3. Business cycle statistics, Great Moderation period (1984-2008)
model with real rigidities model without real rigidities
US data monetary productivity both monetary productivity both
(|w)>% 1.13 1.10 0.28 1.13 0.37 0.50 0.62
(xw)>% 8.07 5.45 1.67 5.67 1.68 0.70 1.81
(xw)@(|w) 7.12 4.95 5.97 5.02 4.53 1.39 2.92
(yw)@(|w) 9.18 5.90 11.00 6.32 6.31 3.10 4.50
(w)@(|w) 15.79 9.90 14.08 10.20 9.52 3.63 6.36
(qw)@(|w) 0.78 0.58 0.70 0.59 0.53 0.16 0.34
(kw)@(|w) 0.56 0.44 1.51 0.56 0.50 0.59 0.56
(qwkw)@(|w) 1.22 1.00 2.04 1.09 1.00 0.70 0.82
(kw)@(qw) 0.71 0.76 2.17 0.96 0.95 3.60 1.64
(zkw > |w) 0.11 0.99 0.16 0.94 0.99 0.78 0.84
(tw ) 0.38 0.79 0.12 0.80 0.99 0.29 1.03
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A quick comparison between Tables 2 and 3 reveals that the labor market has actually
become more volatile in relative terms in the Great Moderation period. That is, the decline in
output volatility that has been extensively documented seems not to have been accompanied by
a proportional decline in the volatility of the labor market. As a result, both models now nd
it harder to match the observed labor market volatility. However, the model with real rigidities
again performs much better in this regard. For instance, the relative standard deviation of
unemployment is now 71% of that in the data, compared to 41% when real rigidities are
abstracted from. The corresponding gures for the relative standard deviation of employment
are 76% and 44%, respectively. This allows the model with real rigidities to come closer to the
data also in terms of the volatility of total hours.
Also, the intensive margin of labor seems to have become more volatile relative to the
extensive margin in the Great Moderation period, although the former is still less than three
quarters as volatile as the latter. Both models actually hit the target for the relative standard
deviation of hours per employee. However, the low volatility of employment in the model
without real rigidities leads to the implausible prediction that hours per employee are about
two thirds more volatile than employment. In contrast, the model with real rigidities predicts
slightly smaller  uctuations in the intensive margin than in the extensive one.
4.3.2 Robustness: alternative demand specications
The analysis so far has assumed a simple cash-in-advance specication for aggregate demand,
in order to simplify the explanation of the main mechanisms at play. I now check the robustness
of the baseline results to alternative specications for aggregate demand. First, I consider a
"money in the utility function" (MIU) specication, in order to introduce an interest-sensitive
money demand equation. Following Krause and Lubik (2007), I assume that households enjoy
a utility  ow " log(Pw@Sw) from their holdings of real money balances, Pw@Sw  pw. The rst
order condition for money, Pw, can be expressed as "@pw = x0 (fw) (Uw  1) @Uw, which together
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with the standard consumption Euler equation, x0 (fw) @Sw = UwHwx0 (fw+1) @Sw+1, represent the
new aggregate-demand block (replacing equation 6). Log-linearizing the latter two equations
and the identity pw@pw31 = (PwSw31) @ (SwPw31) = exp (w) @w, and using fˆw = |ˆw, we obtain
pˆw = 31|ˆw 

1 
Uˆw>
|ˆw = Hw|ˆw+1  
³
Uˆw Hww+1
´
> (41)
pˆw = pˆw31 + w  ˆw>
respectively, which replace equation (E3) in the log-linear representation of the model. The
third and fourth columns of Table 4 report unconditional second moments in the MIU specica-
tion, both for the case with and without the real rigidity mechanism. Notice rst that, relative
to the results from the baseline CIA specication in Table 2, the MIU specication generates
less labor market volatility. This re ects the fact that part of the variation in real money
balances is now absorbed by nominal interest rates and not just by output, hence dampening
the eects on job creation and (un)employment. However, I nd again that the version with
real rigidities performs better in terms of labor market volatility.30 Relative unemployment
volatility in the model equals 76% of the empirical measure, compared to 44% in the model
without real rigidities; the volatility of vacancies, labor market tightness and employment are
also better captured when real rigidities are at work. Both models now counterfactually predict
larger  uctuations in employment than in hours per employee, although the model with real
rigidities again performs better in this respect.
30Real rigidities amplify employment and unemployment  uctuations also conditional on each type of shock
(monetary and productivity shocks). Conditional results are available upon request.
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Second, following most of the recent New Keynesian literature I consider a cashless environ-
ment in which the central bank directly sets the nominal interest rate. In particular, I assume
that the monetary authority follows a standard Taylor rule,
Uˆw = UUˆw31 + (1 U)
¡
!w + !|{|ˆw
¢
+ %Uw > (42)
where U, ! and !| capture the degree of interest-rate smoothing and the response to in ation
and output growth, respectively, and %Uw is an iid shock that replaces the monetary shock %pw .
Equation (42), together with (41), replace now equation (E3) as the aggregate-demand block of
Table 4. Business cycle statistics, alternative demand specications
money in the utility function Taylor rule
US data real rigidities no real rigidities real rigidities no real rigidities
(|w)>% 2.03 2.02 1.22 2.03 1.26
(xw)>% 10.70 8.08 2.83 6.54 2.29
(xw)@(|w) 5.28 4.00 2.32 3.22 1.82
(yw)@(|w) 6.52 5.90 4.39 5.48 3.71
(w)@(|w) 11.59 8.58 5.54 7.32 4.52
(qw)@(|w) 0.62 0.47 0.27 0.38 0.21
(kw)@(|w) 0.35 0.67 0.71 0.73 0.70
(qwkw)@(|w) 0.86 1.05 0.91 1.01 0.84
(kw)@(qw) 0.57 1.44 2.64 1.93 3.30
(zkw > |w) 0.54 0.97 0.92 0.97 0.93
(tw )>% 0.74 0.93 1.37 0.61 1.13
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the log-linearized model. The last two columns of Table 4 report unconditional second moments
generated by the Taylor rule specication with and without real rigidities.31 Overall, this
specication produces less labor market volatility than theMIU or CIA specications. Following
for instance a shock to the policy rate, the systematic component of the Taylor rule moves in the
opposite direction, hence dampening the eects of the exogenous policy impulse on the economy.
Once again, however, real rigidities act towards increasing labor market volatility and hence
improve the model’s performance. For instance, the relative volatilities of unemployment and
employment are both 61% of their respective empirical counterparts, compared to 34% in the
absence of real rigidities. Indeed, the weaker in ation response under real rigidities dampens
the  uctuations in the systematic component of the policy rule. Following e.g. a negative shock
to the policy rate, the actual rate falls by more, hence amplifying the expansion in output and
employment. Following a positive productivity shock, the policy rate falls by less and output
increases by less; as a result, labor demand falls by more.
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the eect of search and matching frictions in the labor market on rms’
pricing decisions, in a model where price-setters are actually subject to such frictions. In doing
so, it departs from most of the literature on New Keynesian models with search and matching
frictions, which separates the rms making the pricing decisions from the rms that face search
frictions. The framework presented here therefore helps understand how price decisions are
made in a context in which rms cannot costlessly and immediately adjust employment.
The main theoretical result is that search frictions give rise to real rigidities (or ’strategic
complementarities’) in price-setting. This mechanism leads each individual price-setter to make
31For the purpose of this exercise, I set the policy rule coe!cients to standard values: U = 0=8, ! = 1=5
and !| = 0=5. The standard deviation of the interest rate shock, 
¡
%Uw
¢
= 0=37%, is chosen to match the
standard deviation of output in the data. Results conditional on each shock type (monetary and productivity)
are available upon request.
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smaller price changes in response to the same macroeconomic  uctuations. On the aggregate,
real rigidities slow the adjustment of the overall price level. This is re ected in a smaller
sensitivity of in ation to average real marginal costs, that is, in a  atter New Keynesian Phillips
curve. The increased sluggishness in the price level makes in ation less volatile and more
persistent for a given average frequency of price adjustment, a feature that is common to
other real-rigidity mechanisms such as rm-specic capital. More importantly, real rigidities
improve the model’s performance along those labor market dimensions that the standard New
Keynesian model is not designed to address. In particular, real rigidities bring both the size
of unemployment  uctuations and the relative volatility of the two labor margins closer to the
data. The corollary is that having rms make both hiring and pricing decisions within the
popular New Keynesian search-and-matching model does not merely represent an increase in
its realism, but can also help it match those labor market facts that constitute its raison d’etre.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
From equation (29) in the text, I can write the rm’s vacancy posting decision as
vy

(1 )ˆw = Hw



³
k˜lw+1 + kˆw+1
´
+
μ
1 
1 
1 
s()
¶
vy

(1 )ˆw+1
¸
> (A1)
where k˜lw+1 = kˆlw+1  kˆw+1 is the rm’s relative number of hours per worker. Hours per worker
admit the exact log-linear representation kˆlw = |ˆglwdwqˆlw. Therefore, I can write k˜lw = |˜glwq˜lw.
This becomes
k˜lw = S˜lw  q˜lw (A2)
once I use the fact that |˜glw = S˜lw. The rm’s expected relative price is given by
HwS˜lw+1 = Hw (logSlw  logSw+1) + (1 )Hw
¡
logS Wlw+1  logSw+1
¢
= Hw
³
S˜lw  w+1
´
+ (1 )Hw
μ
logS Wlw+1  logS
W
w+1 +

1 
w+1
¶
= S˜lw  (1 ) Wq˜lw+1= (A3)
In the second equality I have used the fact that logS Ww+1  logSw+1 = [@(1 )]w+1, where
w+1  log(Sw+1@Sw) is the in ation rate. In the third equality I have used logS Wlw+1 logS Ww+1 =
 Wq˜lw+1. Using (A2) and (A3), expected relative hours are given by
Hwk˜lw+1 = HwS˜lw+1  q˜lw+1
= S˜lw  [1 (1 ) W] q˜lw+1= (A4)
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This implies that Hwk˜lw+1 averages to zero. Averaging (A1) across all rms and substracting the
resulting expression from (A1) yields Hwk˜lw+1 = 0. Combining this with (A4), I nally obtain
q˜lw+1 = 

1 (1 ) W
S˜lw=
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Using (31) in the text to substitute for q in (35), I obtain the following equation for  W,
 W =
(1 )
1 +   
³

13(13)W
´ =
This can be written as
d( W)2 + e W + f = 0> (B1)
where
d  (1 + )(1 ) A 0> (B2)
e   [1 + (2   )] ? 0> (B3)
f  (1 ) A 0= (B4)
The quadratic equation (B1) has two solutions. The latter are real numbers if and only if
e2  4df A 0. Using the denitions of d, e and f, the inequality e2  4df A 0 can be written as
[1 + (2   )]2 A 4(1 + )(1 )(1 )=
After some algebra, it is possible to express the latter inequality as
1 + ()2 2(1 )2 + 2 [1  + (1 )] A 0>
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which holds for any  5 [0> 1) and  5 [0> 1). Equation (B1) has therefore two real solutions,
given by
( W1> 
W
2) =
μ
e
s
e2  4df
2d
>
e+
s
e2  4df
2d
¶
=
It is possible to show that the solutions for both  W and q have to be positive. To see this,
dene
q1(
W) 
1 +   (1 )@W

>
q2(
W) 

1 (1 ) W
=
The function q1( W) is obtained by solving for q1 in equation (35) in the text. The solutions for
q and  W are given by the two points of intersection of both functions in ( W> q) space. Both
functions are strictly increasing in  W. For  W ? 0, q1( W) A (1 + ) @ and q2( W) ? .
Since (1 + ) @ A , there can be no solution for  W ? 0. For  W A 0, the signs of q1 and
q2 coincide only in the non-empty interval ((1 )@ (1 + ) > 31(1 )31), in which both
functions are strictly positive.
Finally, it is possible to show that  W2 implies explosive dynamics. To see this, notice that a
rm’s relative price and employment stock evolve according to
5
97
HwS˜lw+1
q˜lw+1
6
:8 =
5
97
 + (1 ) Wq 0
q 0
6
:8
5
97
S˜lw
q˜lw
6
:8 =
This system implies convergent dynamics only if the eigenvalues of the 2x2 matrix are inside
the unit circle. These eigenvalues are 0 and +(1) Wq. Since +(1) Wq A 0 (as a result
of both  W and q being positive), a non-explosive solution must satisfy +(1 ) Wq ? 1, or
equivalently  Wq ? 1. Using equation (31) in the text, this requires in turn
 W ?
1

= (B5)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 50 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0806
I now dene I ( W)  d( W)2 + e W + f, where d, e and f are given by equations (B2), (B3) and
(B4), respectively. Since I ( W) is a convex function, it follows that I ( W) ? 0/  W 5 ( W1>  W2),
where  W1>  W2 are the two roots of I ( W). Evaluating I (·) at 1@, I obtain
I
μ
1

¶
= (1 + )
1

(1 )

1

+ (2   )
¸
+ (1 )
= 


? 0=
It follows that  W1 ? 1@ ?  W2, which means that  W2 violates (B5) and therefore implies explosive
dynamics. As emphasized by Woodford (2005), in order for a log-linear approximation around
the steady state to be an accurate approximation of the model’s exact equilibrium conditions,
the dynamics of rms’ relative prices and employment stocks must remain forever near enough
to the steady state. Since  W2 violates this condition, I set  W equal to  W1.
6.3 A search model with a producer-retailer structure
Consider an economy where technology and preferences are the same as in the model presented
in section 2, but with a dierent goods-market structure. In particular, a continuum of identical
producers produce a homogenous intermediate good that is sold to retailers at the perfectly
competitive price pfw. Prots of an individual producer are given by
lw = pfwDwqlwklw  zw(klw)qlw 
"
x0(fw)
ylw +Hww>w+1lw+1=
The surplus of worker and rm are given respectively by
Vzlw = zw(klw)
e+ k1+lw @(1 + )
x0(fw)
 s(w)
Z 1
0
ymw
yw
Hww>w+1Vzmw+1gm + (1 )Hww>w+1V
z
lw+1>
Vilw = pfwDwklw  zw(klw) + (1 )Hww>w+1V
i
lw+1= (C1)
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Hours per employee are chosen in a privately e!cient way, that is, so as to maximize the joint
match surplus, Vzlw + V
i
lw. The resulting rst order condition is given by
pfwDw =
klw
x0(fw)
> (C2)
which implies that hours are equalized across rms, klw = kw. Since all producers behave
symmetrically, I can drop the subscript l. Log-linearization of equation (C2) produces equation
(E2) in the text.
Nash-bargaining implies that (1  ) logViw =  logVzw . The solution for the real wage is
given by
zw(kw) = (1 )pfwDwkw + 

e+ k1+w @(1 + )
x0(fw)
+ s(w)Hww>w+1V
z
w+1
¸
= (1 )

pfwDwkw +
"
x0(fw)
w
¸
+ 
e+ k1+w @(1 + )
x0(fw)
= (C3)
The rst-order conditions with respect to vacancies and employment are given by equations
(11) and (12) in the text, without l subscripts. Combining the latter with (C2) and (C3), we
have that the job creation condition is given again by equation (20), without l subscripts, which
becomes (E4) when log-linearized.
Finally, retailers buy the intermediate input at the real price pfw and transform it into
dierentiated nal goods with a linear technology. Therefore, pfw is also the real marginal cost
of retailers and is independent of their pricing decisions. The optimal pricing decision common
to all price-setting retailers is given by
Hw
"X
W=w
W3ww>WS

W |W
μ
S Ww
SW


  1
pfW
¶
= 0=
Log-linearizing the previous equation and combining it with w = [(1 ) @] (logS Ww  logSw),
I obtain equation (40) in the text.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 52 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0806
References
[1] Altig, David, Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum and Jesper Lindé (2004). "Firm
-Specic Capital, Nominal Rigidities and the Business Cycle", working paper, forthcoming
in Review of Economic Dynamics.
[2] Andolfatto, David (1996). "Business Cycles and Labor-Market Search", American Eco-
nomic Review, 86(1), pp. 112-132.
[3] Andrés, Javier, Rafael Doménech and Javier Ferri (2006). Price Rigidity and the Volatility
of Vacancies and Unemployment, International Economics Institute Working Paper 0601.
[4] Ball, Laurence and David Romer (1990). "Real Rigidities and the Non-Neutrality of
Money", Review of Economic Studies, 57(2), pp. 183-203.
[5] Barnichon, Régis (2008). Productivity, Aggregate Demand and Unemployment Fluctua-
tions, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2008-47, Board of Governor of the Federal
Reserve System.
[6] Bils, Mark (1987). "The Cyclical Behavior of Marginal Cost and Price", American Eco-
nomic Review, 77(5), pp. 838-855.
[7] Bils, Mark and Peter J. Klenow (2004). "Some Evidence on the Importance of Sticky
Prices", Journal of Political Economy, 112(5), pp. 947-985.
[8] Blanchard, Olivier Jean and Peter Diamond (1989). "The Beveridge Curve", Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 1-76.
[9] Blanchard, Olivier and Jordi Galí (2010). "Labor Markets and Monetary Policy: A New
Keynesian Model with Unemployment", American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
2(2), pp. 1-30.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 53 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0806
[10] Calvo, Guillermo A. (1983). "Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework", Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, 12(3), pp. 383-398.
[11] Card, David (1994). "Intertemporal Labor Supply: An Assessment", In Advances in
Econometrics: Sixth World Congress, Christopher Sims (ed.), Cambridge University Press.
[12] Christoel, Kai and Tobias Linzert (2005). The Role of Real Wage Rigidities and Labor
Market Frictions for Unemployment and In ation Dynamics, ECB Discussion Paper 556.
[13] Galí, Jordi (1999). "Technology, Employment, and the Business Cycle: Do Technology
Schocks Explain Aggregate Fluctuations?" American Economic Review, 89(1), pp. 249-
271.
[14] Gertler, Mark and Antonella Trigari (2009). "Unemployment Fluctuations with Staggered
Nash Wage Bargaining", Journal of Political Economy, 117(1).
[15] Kim, Chang-Jin and Charles R. Nelson (1999). "Has the U.S. Economy Become More
Stable? A Bayesian Approach Based on a Markov Switching Model of the Business Cycle",
Review of Economics and Statistics, 81(4), pp. 608-616.
[16] Krause, Michael and Thomas Lubik (2007). "The (Ir)relevance of Real Wage Rigidity in
the New Keynesian Model with Search Frictions", Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(3),
pp. 706-727.
[17] Kuester, Keith (2010). "Real price and wage rigidities with matching frictions", Journal
of Monetary Economics, 57(4), pp. 466-477.
[18] McConnell, Margaret M. and Gabriel Pérez-Quirós (2000). "Output Fluctuations in the
United States: What Has Changed Since the Early 1980’s?", American Economic Review,
90(5), pp. 1464-1476.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 54 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0806
[19] Merz, Monika (1995). "Search in the labor market and the real business cycle", Journal of
Monetary Economics, 36(2), pp. 269-300.
[20] Petrongolo, Barbara and Christopher A. Pissarides (2001). "Looking into the Black Box:
A Survey of the Matching Function", Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2), pp. 390-431.
[21] Pissarides, Christopher A. (2000). Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, MIT Press.
[22] – (2009). "The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer?", Econo-
metrica, 77(5), pp. 1339-1369.
[23] Rotemberg, Julio J. and Michael Woodford (1999). "The Cyclical Behavior of Prices and
Costs", In Handbook of Macroeconomics, John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford (eds.),
vol. 1B, pp. 1051-1135.
[24] Shimer, Robert (2005). "The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacan-
cies", American Economic Review, 95(1), pp. 25-49.
[25] – (2008). "The Probability of Finding a Job", American Economic Review: Papers &
Proceedings, 98(2), pp. 268-273.
[26] – (2010). Labor Markets and Business Cycles, Princeton University Press.
[27] Smets, Frank and Rafael Wouters (2007). "Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A
Bayesian DSGE Approach", American Economic Review, 97(3), pp. 586-606.
[28] Sveen, Tommy and Lutz Weinke (2005). "New Perspectives on Capital, Sticky Prices, and
the Taylor Principle", Journal of Economic Theory, 123, pp. 21-39.
[29] – (2009). "In ation and Labor Market Dynamics Revisited", Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 56(8), pp. 1096-1100.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 55 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0806
[30] Thomas, Carlos (2008). "Search and matching frictions and optimal monetary policy",
Journal of Monetary Economics, 55(5), pp. 936-956.
[31] Trigari, Antonella (2006). The Role of Search Frictions and Bargaining for In ation Dy-
namics, IGIER Working Paper No. 304.
[32] – (2009). "Equilibrium Unemployment, Job Flows and In ation Dynamics", Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 41(1), pp. 1-33.
[33] Walsh, Carl E. (2003). Monetary Theory and Policy, MIT Press.
[34] – (2005). "Labor Market Search, Sticky Prices, and Interest Rate Policies", Review of
Economic Dynamics, 8(4), pp. 829-849.
[35] Woodford, Michael (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary
Policy, Princeton University Press.
[36] – (2005). "Firm-Specic Capital and the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve", International
Journal of Central Banking, 1(2), pp. 1-46.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS  
WORKING PAPERS1  
0701 PRAVEEN KUJAL AND JUAN RUIZ: Cost effectiveness of R&D and strategic trade policy. 
0702 MARÍA J. NIETO AND LARRY D. WALL: Preconditions for a successful implementation of supervisors’ prompt 
corrective action: Is there a case for a banking standard in the EU? 
0703 PHILIP VERMEULEN, DANIEL DIAS, MAARTEN DOSSCHE, ERWAN GAUTIER, IGNACIO HERNANDO, 
ROBERTO SABBATINI AND HARALD STAHL: Price setting in the euro area: Some stylised facts from individual 
producer price data. 
0704 ROBERTO BLANCO AND FERNANDO RESTOY: Have real interest rates really fallen that much in Spain? 
0705 OLYMPIA BOVER AND JUAN F. JIMENO: House prices and employment reallocation: International evidence. 
0706 ENRIQUE ALBEROLA AND JOSÉ M.ª SERENA: Global financial integration, monetary policy and reserve 
accumulation. Assessing the limits in emerging economies. 
0707 ÁNGEL LEÓN, JAVIER MENCÍA AND ENRIQUE SENTANA: Parametric properties of semi-nonparametric 
distributions, with applications to option valuation. 
0708 ENRIQUE ALBEROLA AND DANIEL NAVIA: Equilibrium exchange rates in the new EU members: external 
imbalances vs. real convergence. 
0709 GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ AND JAVIER MENCÍA: Modelling the distribution of credit losses with observable and latent 
factors. 
0710 JAVIER ANDRÉS, RAFAEL DOMÉNECH AND ANTONIO FATÁS: The stabilizing role of government size. 
0711 ALFREDO MARTÍN-OLIVER, VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS AND JESÚS SAURINA: Measurement of capital stock 
and input services of Spanish banks. 
0712 JESÚS SAURINA AND CARLOS TRUCHARTE: An assessment of Basel II procyclicality in mortgage portfolios. 
0713 JOSÉ MANUEL CAMPA AND IGNACIO HERNANDO: The reaction by industry insiders to M&As in the European 
financial industry. 
0714 MARIO IZQUIERDO, JUAN F. JIMENO AND JUAN A. ROJAS: On the aggregate effects of immigration in Spain. 
0715 FABIO CANOVA AND LUCA SALA: Back to square one: identification issues in DSGE models. 
0716 FERNANDO NIETO: The determinants of household credit in Spain. 
0717 EVA ORTEGA, PABLO BURRIEL, JOSÉ LUIS FERNÁNDEZ, EVA FERRAZ AND SAMUEL HURTADO: Update of 
the quarterly model of the Bank of Spain. (The Spanish original of this publication has the same number.) 
0718 JAVIER ANDRÉS AND FERNANDO RESTOY: Macroeconomic modelling in EMU: how relevant is the change in regime?
0719 FABIO CANOVA, DAVID LÓPEZ-SALIDO AND CLAUDIO MICHELACCI: The labor market effects of technology 
shocks. 
0720 JUAN M. RUIZ AND JOSEP M. VILARRUBIA: The wise use of dummies in gravity models: Export potentials in 
the Euromed region. 
0721 CLAUDIA CANALS, XAVIER GABAIX, JOSEP M. VILARRUBIA AND DAVID WEINSTEIN: Trade patterns, trade 
balances and idiosyncratic shocks. 
0722 MARTÍN VALLCORBA AND JAVIER DELGADO: Determinantes de la morosidad bancaria en una economía 
dolarizada. El caso uruguayo. 
0723 ANTÓN NÁKOV AND ANDREA PESCATORI: Inflation-output gap trade-off with a dominant oil supplier.  
0724 JUAN AYUSO, JUAN F. JIMENO AND ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: The effects of the introduction of tax incentives 
on retirement savings. 
0725 DONATO MASCIANDARO, MARÍA J. NIETO AND HENRIETTE PRAST: Financial governance of banking supervision.
0726 LUIS GUTIÉRREZ DE ROZAS: Testing for competition in the Spanish banking industry: The Panzar-Rosse 
approach revisited. 
0727 LUCÍA CUADRO SÁEZ, MARCEL FRATZSCHER AND CHRISTIAN THIMANN: The transmission of emerging 
market shocks to global equity markets. 
0728 AGUSTÍN MARAVALL AND ANA DEL RÍO: Temporal aggregation, systematic sampling, and the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
0729 LUIS J. ÁLVAREZ: What do micro price data tell us on the validity of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve? 
0730 ALFREDO MARTÍN-OLIVER AND VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS: How do intangible assets create economic value? 
An application to banks. 
                                                           
1. Previously published Working Papers are listed in the Banco de España publications catalogue. 
0731 REBECA JIMÉNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ: The industrial impact of oil price shocks: Evidence from the industries of six 
OECD countries. 
0732 PILAR CUADRADO, AITOR LACUESTA, JOSÉ MARÍA MARTÍNEZ AND EDUARDO PÉREZ: El futuro de la tasa 
de actividad española: un enfoque generacional. 
0733 PALOMA ACEVEDO, ENRIQUE ALBEROLA AND CARMEN BROTO: Local debt expansion… vulnerability 
reduction? An assessment for six crises-prone countries. 
0734 PEDRO ALBARRÁN, RAQUEL CARRASCO AND MAITE MARTÍNEZ-GRANADO: Inequality for wage earners and 
self-employed: Evidence from panel data. 
0735 ANTÓN NÁKOV AND ANDREA PESCATORI: Oil and the Great Moderation. 
0736 MICHIEL VAN LEUVENSTEIJN, JACOB A. BIKKER, ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL AND CHRISTOFFER KOK-
SØRENSEN: A new approach to measuring competition in the loan markets of the euro area. 
0737 MARIO GARCÍA-FERREIRA AND ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: Employment risk and household formation: Evidence 
from differences in firing costs. 
0738 LAURA HOSPIDO: Modelling heterogeneity and dynamics in the volatility of individual wages. 
0739 PALOMA LÓPEZ-GARCÍA, SERGIO PUENTE AND ÁNGEL LUIS GÓMEZ: Firm productivity dynamics in Spain. 
0740 ALFREDO MARTÍN-OLIVER AND VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS: The output and profit contribution of information 
technology and advertising investments in banks. 
0741 ÓSCAR ARCE: Price determinacy under non-Ricardian fiscal strategies. 
0801 ENRIQUE BENITO: Size, growth and bank dynamics. 
0802 RICARDO GIMENO AND JOSÉ MANUEL MARQUÉS: Uncertainty and the price of risk in a nominal convergence 
process. 
0803 ISABEL ARGIMÓN AND PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS: Los determinantes de los saldos presupuestarios de las 
Comunidades Autónomas. 
0804 OLYMPIA BOVER: Wealth inequality and household structure: US vs. Spain. 
0805 JAVIER ANDRÉS, J. DAVID LÓPEZ-SALIDO AND EDWARD NELSON: Money and the natural rate of interest: 
structural estimates for the United States and the euro area. 
0806 CARLOS THOMAS: Search frictions, real rigidities and inflation dynamics. 
 
Unidad de Publicaciones
Alcalá, 522; 28027 Madrid
Telephone +34 91 338 6363. Fax +34 91 338 6488
e-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
